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This Special Issue aims at interrogating the judicial and extra-judicial challenges that arise 
from the EU complex administrative framework, which can be characterized as both multi-
level—arising from the vertical cooperation between EU and national authorities—and 
cross-level—arising from horizontal cooperation between national authorities themselves. 
It starts from the premise that there may be decisions affecting natural and legal persons 
which cannot be easily reviewed judicially, whereas in extra-judicial cooperation, the lack of 
common standards or practices across Member States may undermine the effectiveness of 
EU policies and objectives. This Special Issue focuses on various mechanisms of horizontal 
and vertical cooperation, such as regulatory patterns giving rise to transnational 
administrative acts and mutual recognition systems, case studies of composite procedures 
in the field of the genetically modified organisms regime and information sharing in asylum 
policy, as well as multi-level inspection activities for the enforcement of EU law. It further 
complements the analysis on the judicial challenges arising from those cooperative 
structures with an examination of extra-judicial avenues of control in the EU administrative 
framework, namely the “EU queries” process and the cooperation of ombud offices, as well 
as the audit of the EU budget. This Special Issue reflects on ways to overcome the current 
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In the system of executive federalism1 set up by the treaties, it is the Member States that 
are primarily responsible for the implementation of EU law at the domestic level. Instances 
of centralized administration are the exception in the broader EU administrative framework. 
However, beyond the dichotomy of “direct vs. indirect administration,” increasingly more 
forms of “shared administration” have emerged, where national and EU authorities 
cooperate with various intensities, in various ways, and at different moments of the 
decision-making process, in the implementation of EU law. In this context, a multi-level 
system of cooperation is being shaped that encompasses various levels: The regional/local, 
the national, and the EU levels. In this dense, multi-level administrative framework, 
administrative authorities at various levels of governance cooperate in putting EU law into 
effect. At the same time, and though not necessarily linked to the phenomenon of “shared 
administration,” EU law has also contributed to the shaping of a system of “transnational 
administration,” which refers to the possibility for an administrative act to have effect 
beyond its territory, with or without the need for recognition by the receiving Member State. 
 
This Special Issue aims at examining the judicial and extra-judicial challenges arising from 
this complex and multi-layered system of cooperation. Its point of departure is, first, the 
observation that the administrative cooperation in the EU is multi- and cross-level, namely 
arising from the vertical cooperation between EU and national authorities or from the 
horizontal cooperation between national authorities themselves. Second, underlying the 
path of enquiry is the observation that, in the EU multi-level action, there might be decisions 
affecting natural and legal persons which cannot be judicially reviewed in an effective way. 
Third, in areas of extra-judicial cooperation, the lack of common standards or practices 
across Member States may undermine the effectiveness of EU policies and objectives. 
 
The system of shared administration is present nowadays in virtually all EU policy fields, 
albeit with various shapes and intensities, such as competition law, the system of 
authorizations for the marketing of pharmaceutical products or genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), data protection, the allocation of funds, and asylum policy. This Special 
Issue takes stock of this diversity, yet it does not aim to provide an all-encompassing 
overview of the system of shared administration in the European Union and its judicial and 
non-judicial challenges. Rather, it aims to go beyond the specific policy fields and tackle 
broad phenomena in the EU multi- and cross-level administrative framework.  
 
In order to do so, this Special Issue discusses the rapidly emerging paradigm of transnational 
administrative acts (Dubos and Chevalier), the mechanism of mutual recognition in the 
 
1 See, e.g., Robert Schütze, From Rome to Lisbon: “Executive Federalism” in the (New) European Union, 47 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1385 (2010). 
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European administrative space (Arroyo-Jiménez), the cooperation mechanisms in inspection 
activities (De Bellis) and in the field of maladministration (Athanasiadou and Vogiatzis), as 
well the implications of the system of shared administration for the control over the EU 
budget (Cipriani). 
 
Furthermore, this Special Issue presents two emblematic cases in the field of GMOs 
authorizations (Eliantonio and Lanceiro) and asylum policy (Vavoula) in the vertical and 
horizontal system of administrative cooperation for the implementation of EU law. Both 
contributions, albeit sector-specific, are used to draw some overarching conclusions on the 
challenges in the EU multi- and cross-level administrative framework. 
 
This introduction, after presenting the state of the art on the questions tackled by this 
Special Issue and highlighting its contribution to existing literature on the topic, presents a 
number of observations aimed to bring together various trends emerging from the Articles 
contained in this Special Issue. It also explores avenues for further research and reflection. 
 
B. The EU Multi- and Cross-Level Administrative Framework and its Challenges: The 
Extent of the Investigation so Far and the Open Questions 
 
The cooperative mechanisms in the European administrative space have been labelled 
differently2 and explored under various angles thus far. To date, commentators have 
examined various dimensions of the “integrated administration” in the EU3 and proposed 
typologies of “composite procedures”4 while identifying “accountability gaps” in EU 
 
2 For example, the term Verwaltungskooperation (administrative cooperation) was used initially. See EBERHARD 
SCHMIDT-AßMANN, VERWALTUNGSKOOPERATION UND VERWALTUNGSKOOPERATIONSRECHT IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 
(1996). Other authors have spoken about amministrazione mista (mixed administration), see GIACINTO DELLA CANANEA 
& CLAUDIO FRANCHINI, I PRINCIPI DELL’AMMINISTRAZIONE EUROPEA (2010); and Verwaltungsverbund (administrative 
union), see WOLFGANG WEIß, DER EUROPÄISCHE VERWALTUNGSVERBUND. GRUNDFRAGEN, KENNZEICHEN, HERAUSFORDERUNGEN 
(2010); “integrated administration,” see LEGAL CHALLENGES IN EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED 
ADMINISTRATION (Herwig Hofmann & Alexander Turk eds., 2009); “composite administration,” see THE EUROPEAN 
COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATION (Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold eds., 2011); or 
“co-administration,” see JACQUES ZILLER, Les concepts d’administration directe, d’administration indirecte et de 
co-administration et les fondements du droit administratif européen, in DROIT ADMINISTRATIF EUROPÉEN 235 
(Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère ed., 2007). 
3 See generally   HERWIG HOFMANN, GERARD C. ROWE & ALEXANDER H. TURK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 406 (2011); Herwig Hofmann, Decision-Making in EU Administrative Law—The Problem of Composite 
Procedures, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (2009). For a contribution focusing on the right to be heard see Christina Eckes & 
Joana Mendes, The Right to be Heard in Composite Administrative Procedures: Lost in Between Protection?, 36 EUR. 
L. REV. 651 (2011). 
4 See generally SERGIO ALONSO DE LEÓN, COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017); Filipe Brito 
Bastos, Derivative Illegality in the European Composite Administrative Procedures, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 101 
(2018); Giacinto Della Cananea, The European Union’s Mixed Administrative Proceedings, 68 L. & CONTEMP.  PROBS. 
197 (2005); Mariolina Eliantonio, Judicial Review in an Integrated Administration: The Case of “Composite 
Procedures,” 7 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 65 (2014). 
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governance.5 Some works have explored composite procedures in specific policy fields,6 or 
have discussed the role of European agencies in the system of integrated administration,7 or 
the implications of the CJEU’s rulings where the legal questions linked to composite 
procedures have been tackled.8 
 
The global picture emerging is that of a regulatory paradigm that, while present since 
virtually the inception of the project of European integration, has not yet been fully and 
coherently explored and systematized. This Special Issue aims at further building on the 
earlier works on the system of administrative cooperation in the European Union from 
several perspectives. 
 
First, this Special Issue addresses the extra-judicial, alongside the judicial, challenges in the 
EU multi- and cross-level administrative framework. While some studies have explored 
extra-judicial forms of control in the European multi-level administrative space,9 there is 
 
5 Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach, 13 
EUR. L.J. 542 (2007); Mira Scholten, Shared Tasks, But Separated Controls: Building the System of Control for Shared 
Administration in an EU Multi-Jurisdictional Setting, 10 EUR. J. RISK REG. 538 (2019). 
6 Filipe Brito Bastos, Composite Procedures in the SSM and SRM—An Analytical Overview, in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 
EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 97 (Chiara Zilioli & Karl-Philipp Wojcik eds., 2021); LAURA WISSINK, EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROTECTION 
IN BANKING SUPERVISION: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL PROTECTION IN COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN THE SINGLE 
SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (2020); Mariolina Eliantonio & Sabrina Röttger-Wirtz, From Integration to Exclusion: EU 
Composite Administration and Gaps in Judicial Accountability in the Authorisation of Pharmaceuticals, 10 EUR. J. RISK 
REG. 393 (2019); Laura Wissink, Ton Duijkersloot & Rob Widdershoven, Shifts in Competences Between Member 
States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and Their Consequences for Judicial 
Protection, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 92 (2014). 
7 See CONTROLLING EU AGENCIES: THE RULE OF LAW IN A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Miroslava Scholten & Alex 
Brenninkmeijer eds., 2020); LAW ENFORCEMENT BY EU AUTHORITIES—POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN A SHARED 
LEGAL ORDER (Michiel Luchtman & Miroslava Scholten eds., 2017). 
8 See, e.g., Filipe Brito Bastos, The Borelli Doctrine Revisited: Three Issues of Coherence in a Landmark Ruling for EU 
Administrative Justice, 8 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 269 (2015); Filipe Brito Bastos, Judicial Review of Composite 
Administrative Procedures in the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Berlusconi, 56 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1355 (2019); 
Simona Demková, The Grand Chamber’s Take on Composite Procedures Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism: 
Comments on Judgment of 27 June 2018, 12 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 209 (2019); Paul Dermine & Mariolina Eliantonio, 
Case Note: CJEU (Grand Chamber), Judgment of 19 December 2018, 12 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 237 (2019); Menelaos 
Markakis, Composite Procedures and Judicial Review in the Single Resolution Mechanism: Iccrea Banca, 13 REV. EUR. 
ADMIN. L. 109 (2020); Paolo Mazzotti & Mariolina Eliantonio, Transnational Judicial Review in Horizontal Composite 
Procedures: Berlioz, Donnellan, and the Constitutional Law of the Union, 5 EUR. PAPERS 41 (2020); Leo Neve, The 
Berlioz-Decision of the CJEU Provides Legal Protection for Concerned Persons in Transnational Setting, But Will it 
Hold in the International Area?, 10 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 95 (2017); Catherine Warin, A Dialectic of Effective Judicial 
Protection and Mutual Trust in the European Administrative Space: Towards the Transnational Judicial Review of 
Manifest Error?, 13 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 7 (2020). 
9 See generally Harmut Aden, The European Court of Auditors and its Relationship with National Independent Audit 
Institutions: The Evolving Audit Function in the EU Multilevel System, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 313 (Michael Bauer & Jarle Trondal eds., 2015); Nikos Vogiatzis, Revisiting the Mandate and 
Practice of the European Ombudsman, in THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN AND GOOD ADMINISTRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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certainly scope to explore further the emerging challenges, both from the point of view of 
the individual as well as from the point of view of institutional collaboration. To that end, 
the institutions10— European Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors along with 
their national peers—that have been selected, represent traditional avenues of 
extra-judicial accountability11 in the EU. Furthermore, one of the contributions, by 
Athanasiadou and Vogiatzis, seeks to identify similarities and, mostly, differences between 
the judicial and extra-judicial avenues of cooperation. 
 
Second, two case studies are added to the fast-growing field of composite procedures: GMO 
authorizations and asylum. These case studies are representative in the field, as they 
exemplify procedures with a complex web of horizontal and vertical relationships between 
different national and EU actors, as well as the use of technological tools such as databases 
for the sharing of information.12 In this context, this Special Issue aims to uncover, through 
these two case studies, possible general patterns in judicial challenges for the multi- and 
cross-level system of EU administrative cooperation.  
 
Third, this Special Issue adds to the existing knowledge on composite procedures more 
generally, which so far has predominantly focused on multi- and cross-level decision-making 
procedures. This Special Issue adds the enforcement aspect to the analysis by examining the 
topic of shared inspection procedures, which has thus far not been subject to systematic 
investigation. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the challenges 
arising from administrative cooperation in the EU, because of the particular fundamental 
rights implications of those activities when they take place in a multi-level context.  
 
Fourth, this Special Issue brings to the fore and explores the link between the notions of 
shared and transnational administration. While with the first term, reference is made to 
decision-making processes involving multiple jurisdictions participating at different 
moments and with different intensities,13 the second term refers to the capacity of an 
 
185 (2018); Nikos Vogiatzis, The Independence of the European Court of Auditors, 56 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 667 
(2019). 
10 The term “institutions” is used in a broader sense and does not refer to Article 13 TEU. After all, the European 
Ombudsman is not included therein. 
11 For a full picture it must be accepted, though, that certain domestic Supreme Audit Institutions are of judicial 
character—contrary to the European Court of Auditors. 
12 On the topic of information sharing in the context of composite procedures, see Deirdre Curtin & Filipe Brito 
Bastos, Interoperable Information Sharing and the Five Novel Frontiers of EU Governance: A Special Issue, 26 EUR. 
PUB. L. 59 (2020); Diana-Urania Galetta, Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Jens-Peter Schneider, Information Exchange in the 
European Administrative Union, 20 EUR. PUB. L. 65 (2014). See also Mariolina Eliantonio, Information Exchange in 
European Administrative Law: A Threat to Effective Judicial Protection?, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 531 (2016). 
13 For this definition, see Mariolina Eliantonio, Judicial Review in an Integrated Administration: The Case of 
“Composite Procedures”, 7 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 65 (2014). 
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administrative act to have effects outside the territory where the issuing authority is 
situated. While the two terms may overlap, in that composite procedures may culminate in 
the adoption of a transnational administrative act, this is not always and not necessarily the 
case. Furthermore, while the notion of transnational administrative acts has been developed 
in the context of the debate surrounding the system of mutual recognition,14 this type of act 
may well arise beyond a paradigm of mutual recognition. Despite the capital importance in 
the system of European administrative integration, the notion of transnational 
administration has not been the subject of much analysis, especially in English, and studies 
have remained mostly theoretical.15 This Special Issue aims to advance the conceptual 
understanding of the notion of transnational administration in the European Union; it seeks 
to disentangle the relationships between composite procedures and transnational 
administrative acts, on the one hand, and transnationality and mutual recognition, on the 
other hand, and discuss the challenges these mechanisms pose in terms of judicial 
protection. 
 
C. This Special Issue in Further Detail: Key Issues and Common Themes 
 
This Special Issue starts with the Article by Chevalier and Dubos on transnational 
administrative acts. These are acts that concern at least two national legal orders by reason 
of “the authority that adopted them, the scope of their effects, their addressee(s), and/or 
their decision-making process.”16 A taxonomy of these acts is offered, on the basis of 
whether the act is with or without “transnational imputation” and with or without 
 
14 See Giacinto della Cananea, From the Recognition of Foreign Acts to Trans-National Administrative Procedures, in 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 219 (J. Rodriguez-Arana Muñoz ed., 2016); HERWIG C.H. HOFMANN, GERARD 
C. ROWE & ALEXANDER TURK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 645 (2011) (discussing the 
“transterritorial application of national decisions”); Juan José Pernas García, The EU’s Role in the Progress Towards 
the Recognition and Execution of Foreign Administrative Acts: The Principle of Mutual Recognition and the 
Transnational Nature of Certain Administrative Acts, in RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 15 (J. Rodriguez-
Arana Muñoz ed., 2016); Stefano Dorigo, Mariolina Eliantonio & Rui Lanceiro, The Principle of Mutual Recognition 
in European Administrative Law, 13 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 183 (2020); Angelos S. Gerontas, Deterritorialization in 
Administrative Law: Exploring Transnational Administrative Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423 (2013); Luca De Lucia, 
Administrative Pluralism, Horizontal Cooperation and Transnational Administrative Acts, 5 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 17 
(2012); Luca De Lucia, From Mutual Recognition to EU Authorization: A Decline of Transnational Administrative 
Acts?, 1 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 90 (2016); Henrik Wenander, Recognition of Foreign Administrative Decisions, 71 ZAO ̈RV 
755 (2011). 
15 See, e.g., Marie Gautier, Acte administratif transnational et droit de l’Union européenne, in DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 
EUROPÉEN, supra note 2, at 1303; LUCA DE LUCIA, AMMINISTRAZIONE TRANSNAZIONALE E ORDINAMENTO EUROPEO (2009); 
FLORIAN SCHWETZ, GRENZU ̈BERSCHREITENDE VERWALTUNGSAKTE TRANSNATIONALITA ̈T, GEGENSEITIGE ANERKENNUNG UND 
VERWALTUNGSENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM MEHREBENENSYSTEM (2021); Joachim Becker, Der transnationale Verwaltungsakt: 
übergreifendes europäisches Rechtsinstitut oder Anstoss zur Entwicklung mitgliedstaatlicher 
Verwaltungskooperationsgesetze?, 116 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 855 (2001). 
16 Chevalier & Dubos, The Notion of “Transnationality” in Administrative Law: Taxonomy and Judicial Review, in 
this issue. 
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“transnational effects.”17 Further, when examining the principles that determine the 
competent court, the key aim is to uncover challenges in the availability of judicial review in 
the aforementioned cases. Relying on the well-known principle of effective judicial 
protection, the authors claim that “the softness of the borders of administrative action 
requires the softening of those surrounding the system of judicial review.”18 
 
Arroyo Jiménez, in his contribution, focuses on a particular type of transnational 
administrative arrangement, namely the mechanism of mutual recognition—that is, “a 
regulatory arrangement under which the administrative or judicial authorities of one 
Member State must give legal effects within their territory to rules or acts passed by the 
legislative, administrative or judicial authorities of another Member State”19—in the 
European administrative space. Again, the aim is to explore gaps in judicial protection or 
“judicial control blind spots arising in horizontal interactions.”20 After an exposition of key 
principles surrounding the development, content, and context of effective judicial 
protection within the EU legal order, the different forms of mutual recognition are explored. 
The Article unravels the problems that may arise in judicial review regarding procedure, the 
law that must be applied, deference, and standards or review. 
 
Lanceiro and Eliantonio then shift attention to include vertical cooperation as well. Their 
case study is the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) regime, which is characterized as 
a “playground” for multi-level administration, yet a “nightmare” for effective judicial 
protection. The level of complexity is apparent after careful consideration of the two main 
legal instruments surrounding genetically modified food and feed under Regulation 
1829/2003 and GMOs for uses other than food and feed, notably for cultivation or industrial 
uses under Directive 2001/18. They observe that common features in both procedures are 
a risk assessment by the European Food Safety Authority and “the presence of various 
moments to pre-empt political or judicial confrontation, and provide incentives for 
consensus.”21 This, however, results in gaps in judicial protection, which the existing caselaw 
of the Court of Justice can only partially address. 
 
Information sharing in the context of asylum policy is the focus of the next Article in the 











21 Lanceiro & Eliantonio, The Genetically Modified Organisms’ Regime: A Playground For Multi-Level Administration 
And A Nightmare For Effective Judicial Protection?, in this issue. 
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although the role of the European Data Protection Supervisor is briefly recalled. Vavoula 
argues that the applicable rules concerning Eurodac, “an EU-wide centralized information 
system which is aimed at assisting in the determination of the responsible Member State 
through the joint gathering of information,”22 does not provide for sufficient and effective 
remedies for asylum seekers. Challenges for national courts include the difficulties in 
reviewing irregular registrations in Eurodac and transfers in breach of Article 34 of the Dublin 
III Regulation. In terms of extra-judicial remedies, recourse to national Data Protection 
Authorities (DPAs) is rarely used by individuals. 
 
The next contribution adds the enforcement aspect to the picture: Shared inspection 
procedures is the focus of De Bellis’ Article. Beyond effective judicial protection, De Bellis 
focuses on the inviolability of the home, which is protected by both the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter. The Article draws primarily on the 
principles developed by the Strasbourg Court in its jurisprudence in order for inspections to 
be lawful, but, also, at places on the domestic experience of certain Member States. Applying 
these considerations in the EU legal order and reviewing the case-law of the Luxembourg 
Court, which has accepted that “the lack of ex ante judicial authorization can be 
counterbalanced through procedural guarantees and ex post judicial control,”23 De Bellis 
concludes that the current remedies “fall short in providing a full ex post judicial scrutiny, in 
particular when these powers are used in the context of composite procedures.”24 
 
This Special Issue then considers more closely extra-judicial challenges, starting with ombud 
institutions and the cooperation between the European Ombudsman and her peers. The 
focus of Athanasiadou’s and Vogiatzis’ Article is on the “EU queries,”25 a scheme that enables 
a national office to submit a query on EU law to the European Ombudsman and receive a 
reply. The origins and development of such cooperation, as well as an analysis of all of the 
queries published to date on the European Ombudsman’s website, “with a view to 
systemizing their subject matter and assessing the legal characteristics of the given 
responses,”26 is provided. A comparison with the preliminary reference procedure 
underlines the differences, but also complementary function, and ultimately added value, 
 
22 Vavoula, Information Sharing in the Dublin System: Remedies for Asylum Seekers In-Between Gaps in Judicial 
Protection and Interstate Trust, in this issue. 
 
23 De Bellis, Multi-level Administration, Inspections and Fundamental Rights: Is Judicial Protection Full and 




25 Athanasiadou & Vogiatzis, The EU Queries: A Form of Extra-Judicial Preliminary Reference in the Field of 
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thanks to its speed and flexibility, of the EU queries process in the effective and coherent 
application of EU law. Nonetheless, several challenges are also identified. 
 
This Special Issue concludes with a contribution from Cipriani on the budgetary 
arrangements in the EU’s multilevel setting, with a particular focus on the role of the 
European Court of Auditors (ECA), which—despite its name—is another extra-judicial 
institution. As Cipriani explains, although the Commission formally assumes responsibility 
for the implementation of the budget, in practice this is implemented primarily by various 
domestic authorities. In this context, the role of the ECA in improving accountability is 
particularly challenging. It is claimed that a stronger focus on performance or “value for 
money” audit is required, and also that “the approach based on ‘error rates’ risks to promote 
wrong incentives and ineffective protection of taxpayers’ money.”27 In addition, national 
audit offices could play a key role regarding the follow-up to recommendations addressed 
to Member States. 
 
From the above brief presentation of the seven contributions to this Special Issue, it is 
possible to identify a number of common themes or concerns that emerge from some or 
most of the Articles. To begin with, clearly the principle of effective judicial protection 
arguably permeates the first five Articles of this Special Issue. Effective judicial protection 
features in Article 47 of the Charter and stems also from Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, but its 
development in the EU legal order well predates the Charter.28 It is the imperative of 
effective judicial protection that prompts inquiries about the need to “soften the borders” 
in terms of review of transnational acts; to pay close attention to different forms of mutual 
recognition and the challenges of judicial review arising thereof; to consider the gaps in the 
review of procedures regarding GMOs, information sharing within the asylum system in the 
EU, or multi-level inspection activities.  
 
Within the multi- and cross-level European administrative governance, there is indeed an 
inherent tension between the requirement of effective judicial protection, on the one hand, 
and the system of separation of jurisdiction and the principle of territoriality, on the other 
hand. The system of separation of jurisdiction—inspired by a strict adherence to the 
traditional doctrine of executive federalism—requires that the judicial authority competent 
for reviewing an administrative act be, in cooperative procedures between EU and Member 
State authorities, that of the system to which the act of the procedure belongs. The principle 
 
27 Cipriani, Improving the accountability of the EU budget’s multi-level implementation: Strengthening the 
contribution of the European Court of Auditors, in this issue. 
 
28 See Arroyo Jiménez, in this issue. For an overview of the complex genesis of the principle of effective judicial 
protection and its relationship with the principle of effectiveness and the right to an effective remedy, see Sacha 
Prechal & Rob Widdershoven, Redefining the Relationship Between ‘Rewe-Effectiveness’ and Effective Judicial 
Protection, 4 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 31 (2011). See also Mariolina Eliantonio & Elise Muir, The Principle of Effectiveness: 
Under Strain?, 12 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 255 (2019). 
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of territoriality, relevant in cooperative procedures between national authorities, is inspired 
by considerations of sovereignty and prevents a judicial instance from reviewing acts 
attributable to authorities of another sovereignly equal Member State. The Articles of this 
Special Issue show that, while procedural decision-making integration is a reality in virtually 
all EU policy fields, the default judicial disintegration might often be at odds with the 
requirement of effective judicial protection. 
 
If this Special Issue is able to expand the discussion on the challenges arising on the basis of 
vertical cooperation via zooming in on selected areas, it also invites us to think carefully 
about horizontal cooperation as well, an area which has been less studied in the literature, 
and where the caselaw is possibly less mature than that with respect to vertical cooperation. 
Horizontal cooperation and the transnational nature of the acts and decisions that it 
generates is at the core of the contributions by Chevalier and Dubos; Arroyo Jiménez; and 
Vavoula. The limitations in the review of the “court of destination,” to refer to the 
terminology by Arroyo Jiménez, are apparent throughout these Articles. One example—
among many others—offered by Arroyo Jiménez is the uncertainty about the interpretation 
of the law of origin that the court of destination might face. The possibility of several courts 
considering that they have jurisdiction to review an administrative act also entails a risk of 
contradictions in the assessment of the legality of an administrative act, as Chevalier and 
Dubos remind us.  
 
Yet the discussion on extra-judicial challenges also brings to the fore the challenges arising 
from vertical cooperation. If instances of maladministration occur at the domestic level, and 
if the European Ombudsman’s remit does not extend therein, does this not impose a duty 
on the European and national ombud offices to find suitable forms of cooperation while 
respecting their respective remits? And if the ECA’s audit mandate is rather broad, does this 
not impose a duty on the ECA and the national audit offices to find appropriate ways of 
collaboration within the spirit of Article 287(3) TFEU?29 The aforementioned Articles on 
maladministration and audit seek to reflect on these challenges as well. 
 
If one could use a metaphor, a “cloud” surrounding some of these challenges is the question 
of trust. This path of enquiry certainly applies to the transnationality of administrative acts 
and the system of mutual recognition, but in this Special Issue it is exemplified in the 
contribution by Vavoula. Therein, Vavoula questions, among other things, the “presumption 
of trust” in the administrative practices of other Member States or indeed the tension 
between trust and effective judicial protection: “[T]he tension between trust in modern 
technologies and administrative procedures—fingerprint registration in Eurodac—taken 
place in other Member States, which may not be infallible, and the need to safeguard the 
 
29 This article provides, inter alia, that “[t]he Court of Auditors and the national audit bodies of the Member States 
shall cooperate in a spirit of trust while maintaining their independence.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union art. 287(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47. 
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fundamental rights of asylum seekers—particularly their right to an effective remedy.”30 
Elsewhere, further trust is perhaps being called for: Cipriani’s contribution underlines the 
limitations of the ECA’s resources and argues that follow-up to recommendations addressed 
to Member States could be undertaken by national audit offices. But Cipriani also claims that 
“broadening the geographical scope of the audit work would enhance the possibility of 
drawing conclusions beyond the current limited number of member states visited.”31 The 
above observations entail that formidable legal doctrines can be established on trust, and 
excellent formulations may feature in the treaty or elsewhere, as is the case, for example, 
with Article 287(3) TFEU, but trust across Member States or between national and EU 
authorities is neither a given nor an impossibility: It requires careful consideration of the 
particular arrangements across policy fields, examination of domestic and EU jurisprudence, 
reports and other documents published by extra-judicial institutions, and, of course, 
consideration of empirical evidence. 
 
Lastly, all of the Articles in this Special Issue, either briefly or more extensively, think about 
possible solutions to the problems that they have identified. A comprehensive picture can 
be found in the subsequent Articles, yet certain illustrative examples may be mentioned 
here. Chevalier and Dubos reflect on the ways and the extent of which a national court can 
review a foreign act on grounds of EU law. Arroyo Jiménez explores, in the mechanism of 
mutual recognition, opportunities emerging from the doctrines of Eurobolt32 and Berlioz.33 
The potential of the latter judgment is also recognized by Lanceiro and Eliantonio, with a 
view to addressing certain of the gaps in judicial protection, as it enables a national court to 
review the lawfulness of acts taken by foreign authorities in order to comply with Article 47 
of the Charter. Vavoula claims that a “more thorough” investigation is required by both 
domestic courts and national administrations, which could circumvent the presumption of 
trust and the limitations of judicial review. De Bellis calls for an action for annulment of the 
decision to inspect in areas where this is not possible and EU authorities do have inspection 
powers, while also inviting, in essence, the Luxembourg Court to pay closer attention to the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. Athanasiadou and Vogiatzis argue that, in order to 
improve the transparency and effectiveness of the “EU queries” scheme, a “more formalized 
approach is needed,” in that the EU queries would “benefit from clearly delineating its 
 
30 Vavoula, Information Sharing in the Dublin System: Remedies for Asylum Seekers In-Between Gaps in Judicial 
Protection and Interstate Trust, in this issue. 
 
31 Cipriani, Improving the accountability of the EU budget’s multi-level implementation: Strengthening the 
contribution of the European Court of Auditors, in this issue. 
 
32 ECJ, Case C-644/17, Proceedings Brought by Eurobolt BV, ECLI:EU:C:2019:555 (July 3, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-644/17.  
33 ECJ, Case C-682/15, Berlioz Inv. Fund SA v. Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:373 (May 16, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-682/15. 
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features, outcome and added value vis-à-vis other instruments.”34 Lastly, Cipriani advances 
a clearer focus on performance audit regarding the ECA’s work, further scrutiny across the 
ECA’s audit chambers’ thematic responsibilities, and more intensive cooperation with 
national offices regarding Member State compliance with its recommendations. 
 
D. Avenues for Further Research and Reflection 
 
The Articles in this Special Issue have sought to grapple with the challenges arising in the EU 
multi- and cross-level administrative framework. While administrative vertical and 
horizontal cooperation is an ever more prevalent feature of the European administrative 
space, the phenomenon still deserves further attention and scholarly analysis.  
 
First, the relationship between separation of jurisdictions and the principle of territoriality, 
on the one hand, and the requirement of effective judicial protection, on the other hand, is 
far from settled. With incremental moves and somewhat ad hoc solutions, the Court of 
Justice has tried to move to a more “holistic” system of judicial review; however, the 
emerging picture is still in flux. In this respect, questions that would merit further exploration 
include the following: Will Berlioz find application beyond the field of mutual assistance in 
tax matters? Does Berlusconi not limit the review of the Court of Justice solely to illegalities 
arising from EU law, while leaving illegality stemming from the violation of national law in 
effect immune from judicial review? How can one imagine a “holistic” judicial review when 
composite procedures are at the same time both horizontal and vertical? How could and 
should the Court of Justice’s caselaw be of applications in procedures in which the input of 
the concerned actors is not formalized and can thus be hard to disentangle in the decision-
making process? In this respect, it should be remembered that “jurisdictional boundaries” 
are still the default position, and the dilemmas that the Court is facing should be 
acknowledged.35 One could even speak of challenges that the Court itself is facing when 
addressing judicial gaps that arise in the inevitable forms of vertical and horizontal 
cooperation in the EU. 
 
Second, and linked to the first point, there is potential to explore where extra-judicial 
avenues of control might serve as alternatives to tackle the shortcomings of the judicial 
control mechanisms. To some extent, the exposition of the “EU queries” system in 
comparison with the preliminary reference already indicates the possible complementarity, 
if not the added value, of the extra-judicial avenue. Readers might be aware, of course, of 
some of the general advantages of extra-judicial avenues, which may include more relaxed 
or no locus standi requirements, reduced or no costs, flexibility, speed, a non-adversarial 
nature, and others. A widely used phrase of the second European Ombudsman was that 
 
34 Athanasiadou & Vogiatzis, The EU Queries: A Form of Extra-Judicial Preliminary Reference in the Field of 
Maladministration?, in this issue. 
35 See Filipe Brito Bastos, Luxembourg v B: How Far Should Jurisdictional Limits Be Eroded in the Name of Effective 
Judicial Protection?, 41 EU L. LIVE 10 (2020). 
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there is “life beyond legality.”36 And, indeed, one assumes that there may be some kind of 
trade-off between flexibility, understood in a broad sense to include the aforementioned 
elements, and legally binding decisions; one often cannot have both, and a careful 
consideration of the appropriate avenue would be required. Nevertheless, this Special Issue 
invites further reflection and investigation of such synergies, particularly in the field of 
composite procedures. De Bellis’ contribution identifies “judicial gaps” in inspections: With 
the aforementioned limitations under which an extra-judicial office, such as the European 
Ombudsman, operates, is there scope for the latter to provide some relief? One would note, 
in this respect, that the European Ombudsman’s mandate extends to “activities,” not “acts,” 
and that the office has already produced “ombuds-prudence” regarding OLAF, for example, 
that would certainly require further investigation. 
 
In addition, the contribution by De Bellis, in particular, raises the interesting question as to 
whether further research might be needed so as to unravel points of convergence or 
divergence in terms of human rights jurisprudence of the two European courts. Of course, 
the evolving relationship between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts has been 
thoroughly examined in the literature. Nevertheless, one wonders if in the field of composite 
procedures, in particular, there may be further opportunities for comparative investigation, 
including, but also going beyond, privacy and data protection.  
 
Last, and beyond the question of judicial and non-judicial control of composite procedures, 
the patterns of cooperation in the EU multi- and cross-level administrative framework are 
certainly worthy of further exploration. Vavoula argues, for example, that “recourse to 
vertical cooperation seems a sensible solution” in light of the “forthcoming interoperability 
of EU information systems.”37 Earlier research has shown that horizontal cooperation, often 
based on values of mutual trust and expressed in various patterns of mutual recognition, is 
being progressively eroded by centralizing tendencies in the EU regulatory framework.38 
Similarly, it has been shown that enforcement—traditionally the monopoly of national 
authorities—is increasingly placed within multi-level39 or purely European regulatory 
 
36 See also Vogiatzis, Revisiting the Mandate and Practice of the European Ombudsman, supra note 9, at 13. 
37 Vavoula, Information Sharing in the Dublin System: Remedies for Asylum Seekers In-Between Gaps in Judicial 
Protection and Interstate Trust, in this issue. 
 
38 See, e.g., W.H. ROTH, Mutual Recognition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE EU’S INTERNAL MARKET 429 (Panos 
Kourakos & Jukka Snell eds., 2017) (concerning the field of financial regulation); Luca De Lucia, From Mutual 
Recognition to EU Authorization: A Decline of Transnational Administrative Acts?, 1 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 90 (2016) 
(providing  examples of the setting up of the European Railway Agency and the regulation of novel food). 
39 See, e.g., Federica Cacciatore & Mariolina Eliantonio, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Assessing the Systems of 
Controls of the European Fisheries Control Agencies Inspecting Powers, in CONTROLLING EU AGENCIES: THE RULE OF LAW 
IN A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL LEGAL ORDER 215 (Miroslava Scholten & Alex Brenninkmeijer eds., 2020). 
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structures.40 In this context, this Special Issue shows that there is certainly scope for a 
coherent study across policy or policies with a view to identifying how the various 
cooperative patterns—horizontal and vertical—have evolved, the reasons behind each 
institutional design, and the issues that remain unresolved. 
 
40 See, e.g., Miroslava Scholten, Mind the Trend! Enforcement of EU Law Has Been Moving to “Brussels”, 24 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 1348 (2017). 
